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I. BRIEF HISTORY OF BATSON
"[R]acial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors of-
fends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts."' Federal and
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1. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding "a criminal defendant may object
to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not
the defendant and the excluded juror share the same race").
For over a century, this Court has been unyielding in its position that a defendant is
denied equal protection of the laws when tried before a jury from which members of
his or her race have been excluded by the State's purposeful conduct. The Equal
Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members
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state jury selection affords all parties to a lawsuit the opportunity to elim-
inate a certain number of jurors that the parties feel will hinder their case.
These eliminations, otherwise known as peremptory challenges, arise
from constitutional right,2 and because they may be made without ex-
pressed justification, peremptory challenges have consequently been used
to disguise racial discrimination.3 In the seminal case Batson v. Ken-
tucky,4 the United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of crim-
inal cases, the United States Constitution prohibits racial discrimination
in the exercise of peremptory challenges.s However, because peremptory
challenges do not require a stated reason, the existence of racial discrimi-
nation may not be overtly clear. Thus, to discern whether a peremptory
challenge is a pretext for racial discrimination, the Supreme Court in Bat-
son enunciated a three-step framework:
"First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremp-
tory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[;s]econd, if
that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neu-
tral basis for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the
parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the de-
fendant has shown purposeful discrimination." 6
In other words, after the party asserting a Batson challenge (objecting
party) makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the party seeking
the peremptory challenge (striking party) "must give a 'clear and reason-
ably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that
members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors. Although a defen-
dant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of [the
defendant's] own race, he or she does have the right to be tried by a jury whose mem-
bers are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.
Id. at 404 (internal quotations & citations omitted).
2. See U.S. CONsir. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed. . . ."); U.S. CONs-. amend. VII ("In suits at common
law . . . , the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .").
3. See generally Mikal C. Watts & Emily C. Jeffcott, A Primer on Batson, Including
Discussion of Johnson v. California, Miller-El v. Dretke, Rice v. Collins, & Snyder v. Loui-
siana, 42 S-r. MARY'S L. J. 337 (2011).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding race-based peremptory strikes violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). "Selection procedures that pur-
posefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of
our system of justice." Id. at 87.
6. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 277 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003)).
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challenge[ ].", "The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the
[movant] has established purposeful discrimination."' Five short years
after this framework was announced, the Supreme Court extended its ap-
plication to civil trials.'
Notably, appellate treatment of Batson challenges has been focused on
the application of the three-step framework.'o This is primarily due to
the inconsistent application of Batson among the lower courts, which has
resulted in differing levels of proof among the various steps. The Su-
preme Court has attempted to cure these inconsistencies by refining the
Batson framework. For example, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Cali-
fornia" further defined what constitutes a "prima facie case" under step
one,12 specifically holding that an objecting party need only assert an "in-
ference of discrimination," which can be made through a variety of evi-
dence including statistical analysis." In addition, the Supreme Court
7. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 98 n.20 (1986) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)) (holding that the striking party "must articulate a neutral
explanation related to the particular case to be tried").
8. Id. at 98 (explaining the purpose of each step in a Batson challenge).
The reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions,
shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discrim-
inate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice.
Id. at 99.
9. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending the pro-
hibition of race-based peremptory challenges to civil actions).
Racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or
criminal. Congress has so mandated by prohibiting various discriminatory acts in the
context of both civil and criminal trials. The Constitution demands nothing less. We
conclude that courts must entertain a challenge to a private litigant's racially discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial.
Id. at 630 (citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2003); State v. Fisher, 748 A.2d 377
(Conn. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
11. 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
12. Id. at 168-70 (holding that the objecting party is not required to show that the
opposing party's peremptory strikes were more likely than not based on discriminatory
intent under step one of Batson).
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to suspicions and infer-
ences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process. The inherent
uncertainty present in inquiries of discriminatory purpose counsels against engaging in
needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a
simple question. The three-step process thus simultaneously serves the public pur-
poses Batson is designed to vindicate and encourages "prompt rulings on objections to
peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process."
Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 170.
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similarly refined step three of Batson when it enunciated a variety of
ways to establish "purposeful discrimination," including (1) statistical
analysis of jurors struck;14 (2) comparison of African-American jurors
struck to Caucasian jurors not struck;15 and (3) whether the reasons pro-
vided by the striking party are true or false.16
Although the Supreme Court's Batson opinions have been limited to
the three-step framework, there exists an additional issue-a proverbial
"fourth step"-that deserves discussion: remedying a Batson violation. 7
If a trial court finds discriminatory intent under step three, it is then
charged with fashioning a remedy, a "fourth step," to the Batson viola-
tion." It is this "fourth step" of Batson that is the focus of this Article.
Typically, a Batson remedy will either reinstate the improperly struck ju-
ror or dismiss the entire venire panel and restart voir dire anew. How-
ever, because trial judges typically retain discretion to craft their own
Batson remedies," a unique question is presented: Does a trial judge
have the discretion to select replacement jurors solely on account of their
race?
We did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to
persuade the judge-on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the
defendant to know with certainty-that the challenge was more likely than not the
product of purposeful discrimination.
Id.; see also Price v. Cain, 560 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding "a defendant satisfies
the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred").
14. Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 240-41 (2005) (discussing the sta-
tistical data revealing the number of African-American venire members excluded on
prosecutorial peremptory challenges).
15. Id. at 241 (comparing the answers of struck African-American jurors with those of
Caucasian jurors not struck).
16. Id. at 252.
A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.
If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because
a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been
shown up as false.
Id.
17. Although Batson's fourth step has received little treatment by the courts, it is
likely to gain greater significance as issues arise regarding the propriety of a Batson rem-
edy. See Brief of Appellant at 26, Alexander v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 10-30349 (5th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2010) ("Although purposeful discrimination is one of the issues in this appeal,
this matter also presents a question rarely addressed by the courts-the adequacy of a
Batson remedy.").
18. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (explaining that the trial court has
the duty to weigh the striking party's proffered reason with evidence of discriminatory
intent).
19. See id. at 99 ("In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our
state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to
implement our holding today.").
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In answering this question, this Article revisits the standard employed
to assess the constitutionality of racial classification. In acting within
their judicial capacity, trial judges are considered government actors, and
accordingly, as government actors, any judicial acts that employ racial
classifications, including Batson remedies, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Evaluating this standard, this Article next considers whether race-based
Batson remedies can withstand strict scrutiny. Relying on the tenets of
strict scrutiny, this Article concludes that beyond reseating an improperly
struck juror or dismissing the entire venire panel, a Batson remedy may
not look to the race of prospective jurors in fashioning a Batson remedy.
Any remedy that relies on race cannot survive strict scrutiny, and thus
violates the Constitution.2 0
II. TRIAL JUDGES ARE CONSIDERED GOVERNMENT AcroRs WHEN
REMEDYING BATSON VIOLATIONS
"It is now well established that government bodies, including courts,
may constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to remedy un-
lawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination." 2 1
Nonetheless, it is also well established that "[c]lassifications of citizens
solely on the basis of race 'are by their very nature odious to a free peo-
ple whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."' 2 2 Al-
though the Constitution does not expressly prohibit the use of racial
classifications, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment23 has been interpreted "to prevent the States from purposefully dis-
criminating between individuals on the basis of race."2 4 Similarly, the
20. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 12, Alexander v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 10-
30349 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2010) (asserting that the trial court's remedy-which seats jurors
outside the strike zone because of their race-violated the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment).
21. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (citing Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 412, 480 (1986)).
22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)) (holding that such classifications "threaten to stigmatize individuals by
reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility").
23. U.S. CONs-r. amend. XIV, § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
24. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)); ac-
cord Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race.").
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 25 has been determined to
contain an equal protection component that applies to actions by the fed-
eral government.26 Consequently, governmental racial classifications are
"constitutionally suspect"27 and "[a] racial classification, regardless of
purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon an extraordinary justification." 28 Thus, "any person, of whatever
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to une-
qual treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." 29
To determine whether a particular action or course of conduct is gov-
ernmental, the Supreme Court has looked to (1) "the extent to which the
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits";"o (2) "whether the
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; . . . ").
26. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) ("In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Fed-
eral Government."); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299
(1978).
27. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
28. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
29. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) ("'[T]he standard of
review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefited by a particular classification,' i.e., all racial classifications reviewable under the
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized." (citations omitted)).
"If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based
upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group,
then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. Political judgments regard-
ing the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional
balance, . . . but the standard of justification will remain constant. This is as it should
be, since those political judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by
contending groups within the democratic process. When they touch upon an individ-
ual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the
burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. The Constitution guarantees that right to every person regard-
less of his background."
Id. at 224-25 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358 (plurality opinion) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
30. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) (citing Tulsa
Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)) (finding that the peremptory challenge system could only exist
with "significant participation of the government"). "As discussed above, peremptory
challenges have no utility outside the jury system, a system which the government alone
administers." Id. at 622.
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actor is performing a traditional governmental function";31 and (3)
"whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents
of governmental authority." 3 2 Further, the Court has recognized that the
acts of federal or state judges indisputably constitute governmental ac-
tion, and that a trial judge becomes a discriminatory participant "[b]y
enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge." 3 4 Thus, as govern-
ment actors, state and federal trial judges are required to abide by the
equal protection constructs established in the Constitution, and the rul-
ings-the official pronouncements-of a trial judge must therefore con-
form to the constitutional protections afforded under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.3 5
31. Id. at 621-22 (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); cf S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
544-45 (1987)).
32. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)) (enunciating the various factors
used to determine whether an action is governmental).
33. See id. at 624 ("Without the direct and indispensable participation of the judge,
who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system would serve no
purpose.").
It cannot be disputed that, without the overt, significant participation of the govern-
ment, the peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury trial system of which it is a
part, simply could not exist. As discussed above, peremptory challenges have no util-
ity outside the jury system, a system which the government alone administers.
Id. at 622.
34. Id. at 624 (explaining that a judge takes on an active role in discrimination when
choosing to uphold a challenge based on discrimination).
By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the court "has not only made
itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to place its power, property and pres-
tige behind the [alleged] discrimination." In so doing, the government has "create[d]
the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct," and in a significant way has
involved itself with invidious discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622 (recognizing, implicitly, the judicial actions of trial
judges to be as government actions); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995).
[A] free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality," [Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).], should tolerate no retreat from the
principle that government may treat people differently because of their race only for
the most compelling reasons. Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.
Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227. Interestingly, some courts have determined
that governmental actors not only maintain the authority to remedy the effects of discrimi-
nation, but also retain the duty to take remedial action. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986). "Indeed, our recognition of the responsible state actor's compe-
tency to take these steps is assumed in our recognition of the States' constitutional duty to
take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimi-
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With respect to Batson challenges, the Supreme Court noted in Ed-
monson the critical role trial judges play in the peremptory strike process:
The judge determines the range of information that may be discov-
ered about a prospective juror, and so affects the exercise of both
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. In some cases,
judges may even conduct the entire voir dire by themselves, a com-
mon practice in the District Court where the instant case was tried.
The judge oversees the exclusion of jurors for cause, in this way de-
termining which jurors remain eligible for the exercise of peremptory
strikes. In cases involving multiple parties, the trial judge decides
how peremptory challenges shall be allocated among them. When a
lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the judge advises the juror
he or she has been excused.16
Thus, in analyzing a Batson remedy, it is clear that a trial judge is a
government actor whose racially charged remedies are subject to strict
scrutiny. Interestingly, this presents a bit of a quandary. Typically, a trial
judge maintains the discretion to fashion a remedy under Batson's
"fourth step." However, because this action constitutes government ac-
tion, a remedy that is crafted utilizing racial classifications is reviewed
under a strict scrutiny standard, which inherently limits a trial judge's
discretion."
III. THE USE OF REMEDIAL RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS BY TRIAL
JUDGES is REVIEWED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY
"Because racial characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for
disparate treatment ... ,it is especially important that the reasons for any
such classification be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate." 8
Accordingly, as noted by the Supreme Court, "all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
nation." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. New Kent Cnty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)); see
also Jamie L. Barker, Back to Basics: A "Functional Strict Scrutiny" Solution to the Affirm-
ative Action Controversy, 22 Oino N.U. L. REV. 1363, 1381 (1996) (showing that some
courts have recognized a duty of government actors to rectify racial discrimination).
36. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 623-24.
37. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227 ("[A]II governmental action based
on race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited,'-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed." (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citations omitted)).
38. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."3 9 Under this stan-
dard, a remedy looking only to the color of a juror's skin is not an accept-
able remedy when it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.40 Thus, as will be detailed further below, a ra-
cially-based Batson remedy will likely be found unconstitutional as it can-
not withstand the strictures of this standard.
A. Whether a Compelling Governmental Purpose Exists to Racially
Classify Remedial, Replacement Jurors is Unclear
Prior to a determination of whether a specific governmental action is
"narrowly tailored," it is first necessary to ascertain the "compelling gov-
ernmental purpose" at issue. Although the Supreme Court has refrained
from drawing a bright line as to what constitutes a "compelling govern-
mental purpose," the Supreme Court has stated that race-conscious relief
may be necessary "to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimi-
nation."4 1 In other words, judicial race-based classifications may be
proper where there is a "legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorat-
ing, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified
discrimination." 4 2
As evident through Batson and its progeny, peremptory challenges
have unfortunately served as shelters for disguised racial discrimination.
However, whether remedying the past and present effects of such race-
based discrimination is a constitutional priority is unclear.43 In Cassell v.
39. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227 (overruling the prior holding in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) that provided a different level of review for
remedial actions).
40. See id. at 230 ("[R]equiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial classifica-
tions only when doing so is necessary to further a 'compelling interest' does not contravene
any principle of appropriate respect for a coequal branch of the Government."); see also
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (holding "a government
practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifica-
tions' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny'"); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.
1993) (stating that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a race-based classification to
pass strict scrutiny review by a showing that it supports a "compelling government inter-
est" and is "narrowly tailored" toward that purpose).
41. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475-76
(1986) (discussing the appropriateness of judicial remedies in the context of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006)).
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (noting that "[t]he line of school desegregation
cases[ I ... attests to the ... commitment of the judiciary to affirm all lawful means toward
its attainment").
43. Compare Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976) (finding that
the prevention and remediation of racial discrimination is a national policy of "highest
priority"), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09 (noting that absent specific statutory or judicial
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Texas,44 the Supreme Court unequivocally held that race could not be
used in the selection of juries:
The basis of selection cannot consciously take color into account.
Such is the command of the Constitution. Once that restriction upon
the State's freedom in devising and administering its jury system is
observed, the States are masters in their own household. If it is ob-
served, they cannot be charged with discrimination because of color,
no matter what the composition of a grand jury may turn out to be.4 5
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed whether a
Batson remedy may employ racial classifications, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has rejected a race-conscious remedy holding that acceptance of a
juror on account of "his or her race, in substitution for a juror improperly
excluded because of his or her race, is almost certainly one remedy the
Supreme Court would reject."4 6 In so holding, the Louisiana Supreme
Court disregarded the remedial nature of the racial classification, and in-
stead, focused only on the discriminatory act itself:
[T]he fundamental equal protection concern has been not whether
there has occurred a proportional inclusion or proportional limita-
tion on the jury panel but whether the selection process has "con-
sciously take[n] color into account." Cassell thus made plain over 50
years ago that "[a]n accused is entitled to have charges against him
considered by a jury in the selection of which there has been neither
inclusion nor exclusion because of race.47
violations, the government does not have a greater interest in helping one group of individ-
uals over another).
44. 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) (holding that limiting a venire panel to meet racial
quotas is unconstitutional).
If, notwithstanding this caution by the trial court judges, commissioners should limit
proportionally the number of Negroes selected for grand-jury service, such limitation
would violate our Constitution. Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the
basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race.
[T]he Constitution requires only a fair jury selected without regard to race. Obviously
the number of races and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would
make it impossible to meet a requirement of proportional representation. Similarly,
since there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and no discrimination because of
color, proportional limitation is not permissible.
Id.
45. Id. at 295; see also Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1966) (ac-
cepting the absence of African-Americans serving on juries for thirty years was prima facie
evidence and supported grounds for a retrial).
46. State v. Ball, 824 So. 2d 1089, 1100 (La. 2002) (finding a race-conscious remedy
under the Equal Protection Clause would likely be unconstitutional).
47. Id. (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950)).
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Thus, it is unclear at present whether race-based Batson remedies con-
stitute such a compelling interest authorizing racial classification. How-
ever, even if a compelling purpose may exist for racial classification, the
classification may still be deemed unconstitutional if such action is not
narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest.4 8
B. Using Racial Classifications to Remedy Batson Violations is Not a
Narrowly Tailored Means to Ameliorate Present
Discrimination
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are "narrowly tai-
lored," the Supreme Court has evaluated them using a variety of fac-
tors.49 Although the Court has never determined whether a race-based
Batson remedy is narrowly tailored, some of the factors previously em-
ployed may be useful in predicting the appropriateness of such a remedy.
Specifically, the pertinent factors include "the efficacy of alternative rem-
edies" and "the flexibility and duration of the relief."50 In evaluating
race-based Batson remedies under these criterions, their possible consti-
tutionality fades. Because viable alternative remedies exist-remedies
that do not infringe on the rights of the moving party or juror-employ-
ing racial classifications to remedy Batson violations will likely be held to
be legally untenable.
48. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[E]ven if
the government proffers a compelling interest to support reliance upon a suspect classifica-
tion, the means selected must be narrowly drawn to fulfill the governmental purpose.");
see, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 315 (determining that the attainment of a diverse
student body is a constitutionally permissible goal, but finding that the special admissions
program employed at the University was not a permissible means to attain that goal and
was therefore unconstitutional).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 (1987) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). These factors were enunciated by Justice Powell in his concurrence and include:
(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii)
the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force; (iv)
the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the
effect of the remedy upon innocent third parties.
Id.; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510-11, 514 (enunciating the same factors as cited by Justice
Powell in his Paradise concurrence).
50. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. According to the Court, when assessing the constitu-
tionality of a race-conscious remedy, access to waiver provisions, the effect of the relief on
third party rights, and the manner in which the numerical goals correspond to the pertinent
labor market are all important factors to consider. Id.
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1. Alternative Batson Remedies Not Employing Racial
Classifications Are Equally Available
The existence of an alternative remedy does not, in and of itself, render
a race-based remedy unconstitutional."1 Instead, what must be consid-
ered is the efficacy of the race-neutral alternatives.5 2 Although the Su-
preme Court in Batson specifically left the determination of a proper
remedy to the trial court's discretion," the Court attributed its decision
to the "variety of jury selection practices followed in [] state and federal
trial courts."54
Thus, while Batson made clear that trial courts have discretion to craft
their own remedies, no appellate court has ever approved a remedy that
looks squarely to the race of prospective jurors. Notably, though, the
Supreme Court has implicitly approved two remedies: (1) reinstating the
improperly struck juror or (2) dismissing the entire venire panel and
starting anew." Not surprisingly, these two remedies are by far the most
51. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003) (upholding an affirmative action
plan that implemented a highly individualistic, holistic plan that considered race only to be
a "plus" factor). "Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a repu-
tation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to
members of all racial groups." Id.
52. See NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that where appro-
priate, racial classifications may be used to remedy past discrimination).
No one is denied any right conferred by the Constitution. It is the collective interest,
governmental as well as social, in effectively ending unconstitutional racial discrimina-
tion, that justifies temporary, carefully circumscribed resort to racial criteria, when-
ever the chancellor determines that it represents the only rational, nonarbitrary means
of eradicating past evils.
Id.
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24; accord Koo v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir.
1997) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24). When using the Batson test to determine if
there was any racial discrimination in selecting jury members, the trial judge must have
"perceived a pattern of discrimination develop in peremptory challenges." Id.
54. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24. Counsel for the respondent argued that by imposing
more restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges, not only would it "eviscerate the
fair trial values served by the peremptory challenge," but it would "create serious adminis-
trative difficulties." Id. at 98-99. The Court responded to the first argument by indicating
the importance of trial courts recognizing how peremptory challenges may be used in a
racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 99. As for the second argument, the Court believed
that there was no overwhelming administrative burden created, as the peremptory chal-
lenge system was still used in courts employing the standard the Court recognized in Bat-
son. Id.
55. Id. at 99 n.24. The Court declared that, in respect to what trial courts should do
when faced with racial discrimination:
For the same reason, we express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a partic-
ular case, upon a finding of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to
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predominantly-used remedies in Batson violations.56 Nonetheless, a trial
judge may disapprove dismissing the entire venire panel because of the
time wasted as a result, 7 and likewise, a trial judge may also be reluctant
to reinstate an improperly struck juror if a trial judge believes that such
juror may be nonetheless predisposed to a particular opinion. Yet despite
these potential criticisms, both remedies are equally effective in removing
the discriminatory effects of a Batson violation. Further, as identified be-
low, the traditional remedies listed in Batson ensure that the rights of the
party raising the Batson challenge and the wrongly struck juror are
protected.
discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with
the case . . . , or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with
the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire ....
Id. (citations omitted); cf. McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247 (1996) (holding that
the Batson "error is remediable in any one of a number of ways"). The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit discussed Batson for the issue of "whether a Batson objection raised
for the first time after the conclusion of jury selection is timely." McCrory, 82 F.3d at
1246-47. The Second Circuit was careful to note that a Batson challenge is appropriate
during the jury selection process, as the remedies of either reinstating the dismissed juror
or simply beginning the jury selection process again are available. Id. at 1247. However,
should the Batson objection occur after the jury is selected and the trial begins, then "there
can be no remedy short of aborting the trial." Id.
56. See, e.g., Rice v. White, 2010 WL 1347610, at *22 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2010)
(slip op.).
Normally, the remedy for a Batson violation is to either (1) discharge the venire and
select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case, or (2) disallow
the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged
jurors reinstated on the venire. However, when the procedural posture of the case is
such that neither of these two remedies are available, automatic reversal of the convic-
tion is required.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Butler v. Quarterman, 576 F. Supp. 2d 805, 830-31 (S.D.
Tex. 2008) (finding that the trial court's dismissal of the venire panel was a proper remedy
to the Batson challenge despite the fact that the improperly challenged juror was left off
the panel); United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2007). ("Other
courts have refused to grant new peremptory strikes or to dismiss the venire following a
Batson error, finding that doing so would reward offending conduct by the striking
party."); see, e.g., Peetz v. State, 180 S.W.3d 755, 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th. Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (ordering the "two wrongfully-struck jurors" to be reinstated); People v.
Willis, 43 P.3d 130, 135, 139 (Cal. 2002) (imposing monetary sanctions rather than dis-
missing the remaining jury venire); People v. Moten, 603 N.Y.S.2d 940, 947 (N.Y. 1993)
(explaining the need for the retention of jurors, which is another remedy for a Batson
violation).
57. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 1992) (reinstating an improp-
erly struck juror for purposes of judicial economy and other stated reasons).
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2. Batson Remedies Are Permanent and Inflexible, and Thus, the
Effects of Race-Based Remedies Are Impermissible
An additional factor used to determine if a race-based remedy is nar-
rowly tailored is the duration and flexibility of the remedy.58 This factor,
however, has typically only been applied to remedial affirmative action
programs. In such cases, the Supreme Court has evaluated flexibility by
looking at whether the requirements of the program can be waived and
under what circumstances waiver is available.60 Although this analysis
cannot be directly applied to Batson remedies, what can be assessed is the
permanency of the remedy and the potential effects on the discriminated
party and wrongfully discharged juror.
Peremptory challenges are asserted at perhaps the most critical point in
a trial: the beginning.' A jury trial cannot begin without a jury, and
more importantly, a jury verdict cannot be had without a jury.6 2 As such,
the implications of a race-based Batson remedy are pronounced. By not
reseating the improperly struck juror and instead selecting a replacement
juror on account of his or her race, a trial judge advances the notion that
the color of a person's skin affects a jury verdict. Such a result is untena-
ble as "[j]urymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of indi-
vidual qualifications, and not as members of a race." 63 Thus, while a
race-conscious Batson remedy may seek to rectify the presence of racial
discrimination, such a remedy, in reality, implicitly confirms the underly-
58. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a judicially pre-
scribed race-conscious remedy "must be feasible, workable, effective, and promise realisti-
cally to work and to work now" (citations omitted)).
59. Id. at 619-20.
60. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944) (noting one reason the
exclusion based on race was permissible was its temporary nature).
61. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (recognizing the important and lasting
effect of voir dire).
A prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is
a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings.
The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obliga-
tion of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the
trial of the cause. The voir dire phase of the trial represents the "jurors' first introduc-
tion to the substantive factual and legal issues in a case." The influence of the voir
dire process may persist through the whole course of the trial proceedings.
Id. at 412 (citations omitted).
62. See id. at 413 ("The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal
defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in
accordance with the law by persons who are fair.").
63. Collins v. Walker, 335 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1964) (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 286 (1950)).
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ing motive for the original, improper strike.64  A jury comprised of
venirepersons, of whom one or more are selected for their race, results in
a verdict likewise tainted by racial discrimination.
Further, choosing a replacement juror on the basis of race deprives the
objecting party of the assurance that all jurors are qualified and not prej-
udicially predisposed.65 The simple mechanics of a remedy that replaces
an improperly-struck juror results in the deprivation of the objecting
party of meaningful participation in juror selection. Because replacement
jurors are those who have not been struck for cause or peremptorily chal-
lenged, such venirepersons are likely located beyond the strike zone, and
thus not within the range of jurors originally contemplated by the ob-
jecting party. An objecting party is also precluded from a trial evaluated
by a jury panel selected free of racial bias, which is indefensible as noted
by the Supreme Court: "[I]f race stereotypes are the price for acceptance
of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the
Constitution." 66
Finally, utilizing racial classifications to select a replacement juror also
offends the rights of the wrongly struck juror. In Powers v. Ohio,6 7 the
Supreme Court recognized that jurors likewise have a right to be selected
free of racial discrimination.6 8
A venireperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers a
profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character.
The rejected juror may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts,
as may the defendant if his or her objections cannot be heard. This
congruence of interests makes it necessary and appropriate for the
defendant to raise the rights of the juror. And, there can be no
doubt that petitioner will be a motivated, effective advocate for the
excluded venirepersons' rights.6 9
64. It should also be noted that a Batson remedy that selects a replacement juror-in
lieu of reinstating the wrongfully discharged juror-essentially results in success for the
striking party as the party is allowed to retain its original peremptory strikes. This further
reduces any remedial value of this type of action.
65. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) ("Race discrimina-
tion within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings
conducted there.").
66. Id. at 630 ("Racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the pro-
ceeding is civil or criminal.").
67. 499 U.S. 400 (1990).
68. Id. at 413-14 (focusing on the effects of racial discrimination on the improperly
struck juror).
69. Id.; see also Alex v. Rayne Concrete Servs., 951 So.2d 138, 155 (La. 2007) ("By
denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race or gender, the state
unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror."); Christensen v. State, 875
S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("[Tlhe purpose of a Batson challenge is not to re-
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Thus, replacing an improperly struck juror does nothing to remedy the
racial discrimination suffered by the wrongfully struck juror, and deprives
an individual of the opportunity to take part in governing.70 Conse-
quently, a race-based remedy is not narrowly tailored to remedying the
discrimination perceived by the wronged juror.
IV. CONcLusIoN
Although trial judges, as government actors, have a clear interest, if not
a duty, in remediating Batson violations, a Batson remedy that draws ra-
cial lines is not sufficiently tailored to effectuate proper relief. Instead,
relying on race in ameliorating a Batson violation reinforces the stigma
that a person's race dictates who the person is and how the person will
render a verdict. Reinforcement of such a stigma lies in contradiction to
Batson and its progeny, which seeks to ensure that the selection of jurors
is an individualized process and not one dictated by racial classifications.
While it is undoubtedly a challenge to avoid using a race-based classifica-
tion when curing a Batson violation, equal protection jurisprudence de-
mands that such a challenge be met and not sacrificed.
place an entire panel, which would effectively deny the wrongly struck jurors their oppor-
tunity to serve, but to quash only the prejudice or wrongful strike."); State ex rel. Curry v.
Bowman, 885 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("If the only remedy is dismissal of
the array, the affected veniremember is still not allowed to participate in the process.");
State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 1992) ("[T]he discrimination endured by the
excluded venirepersons goes completely unredressed since they remain wrongfully ex-
cluded from jury service."); Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1992) ("While striking
the venire and beginning selection over with a new jury pool may protect the constitutional
rights of the defendant, it does nothing to remedy the recognized discrimination against
those improperly removed from the jury.").
70. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406, 407.
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the
parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people. It "affords
ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government, an
experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for law." Indeed, with the exception of
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant
opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Id.
71. It is worth noting that although a remedy dismissing the entire venire panel would
still infringe on the discriminated juror's rights, it is the belief of the authors that in some
instances the effects of a Batson violation may cause altered perceptions among previously
selected venirepersons, and in those instances, it is necessary to dismiss the entire venire
panel and begin voir dire anew.
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